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STATE OF UTAH 
of the 
IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
ED\YARD STEYEXS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FEARX GRAY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7781 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
At the beginning of respondent's brief, it is stated 
that appellant's brief contains unnecessary repetition 
and that counsel for respondent is unable to agree with 
the statement contained in appellant's brief. There are 
some repetitions in appellant's brief, but it will be noted 
that respondent's brief, insofar as it accurately reflects 
the evidence, is a mere repetition of what is said in 
appellant's brief. We, of course, did not expect counsel 
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for respondent to agree with the conclusions reached 
by appellant, but nowhere in respondent's brief is it 
pointed out wherein t~ere is any mis-statement of the 
evidence which we have abstracted at some length in 
our opening brief. On page 2 of respondent's brief, men-
tion is made of the fact that on page 5 of appellant's 
brief, we directed the attention. of the Court to errors 
of the trial court that were favorable to the appellant. 
We have always understood that the function of a State-
ment of the Case is to direct the attention of the court 
to the facts without regard to which party is prejudiced 
thereby. 
On page 3 of respondent's brief, attention is called 
to dashes after the word Dixon on page 81 of the tran-
script. Apparently something is claimed for the dashes. 
However, there can be no misunderstanding of the fact 
that the defendant on both his direct and cross-exam-
ination testified that he did not pay $1000.00 on the note 
(Tr. 423-424). No amount of argument can change that 
fact and we submit that no authority can be found that 
an award should be sustained in favor of a party who, 
on both direct and cross-examination, testifies under oath 
that he is not entitled thereto. Nor does the plaintiff 
on page 64, or at all in his reply to the amended counter-
claim, recognize any such a credit, but on the contrary 
on such page plaintiff alleges that defendant is charge-
able with $1000.00 of advance payment by Cudahy Pack-
ing Co. Again on page 3 of respondent's brief it is said 
that Exhibit U was admitted in evidence upon 1notion of 
defendant's counsel. That is true, but it was only after 
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plaintiff had produced such exhibit showing that the 
overpayment had been made to respondent that any 
such admission was forthcoming (Tr. 620). Moreover 
the pleadings in which defendant admitted that he had 
received the overpayment of $1000.00 was not made until 
after the defendant was confronted with the telegram. 
As pointed out in our original brief, page 2, the Amended 
Counterclaim was not filed until after all of the evidence 
had been concluded. 
On page 4 of respondent's brief, it is said that when 
counsel reached page 13 of his brief, he forgot what he 
said on pages 1 and 2 of his brief. Counsel for respond-
ent is in error in assuming that counsel for appellant 
was forgetful in such particular. The fact is that in 
the original counterclaim (R. 8 to 17) the defendant made 
no claim for extra compensation for men and equipment 
used to feed the steers that were fed by him. He sought 
credit at the rate of 35 cents per head for feeding the 
steers as is shown on page 14 of his Counterclaim. When 
he testified, he repeatedly stated that it cost 35 cents per 
day for feed for the steers fed by him (Tr. 246 and 427). 
At no time in his testimony did the defendant say that 
it cost 36lf2 cents per day for feed which was fed to the 
steers. He did testify as to the amount of hay, grain, 
corn, cottonseed meal and bran which the steers would 
eat per day. It will be noted he did not testify that the 
steers would eat the maximum amount he sought credit 
for throughout the entire feeding period. If he had so 
testified, his testimony would have been in direct conflict 
with all of the other witnesses, including his own witness, 
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Rodney Martin. Notwithstanding the defendant repeat-
edly stated that 35 cents per day was the cost of feeding 
the steers. When the Amended Counterclaim was filed, 
which was after all of the evidence was in, the cost of 
the feed for the steers was boosted to 36¥2 cents per 
day and the defendant was allowed all he asked for 
men and equipment, which he claimed he used in caring 
for the steers. The law is well settled that the testimony 
of a witness is no stronger than its weakest part. The 
record conclusively shows that defendant's memory was 
enlarged after he learned that he must have additional 
charges to escape a substantial judgment being rendered 
against him in favor of the plaintiff. 
REPLY TO POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT AS TO THE REASON ABLE 
VALUE OF FEEDING CATTLE. 
On page 9 of respondent's brief, it is said that coun-
sel for the plaintiff presents a two-horned dilemma to 
the court because he concedes that defendant be allowed 
25 cents per day for feeding the steers that were fed 
by him. There is a legal axiom applicable to situations 
such as the one here presented that the law, in certain 
kinds of evidence is intended as a shield, not a sword. 
The fact that the plaintiff is willing to allow the defend-
ant credit for the reasonable value of the feed which the 
steers ate does not preclude him from insisting that 
when the defendant seeks to recover almost twice what 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
other cattle feeders fed their steers that he produce com-
petent proof of such excessive claim. 
It is also said on page 9 of defendant's brief that it 
is a reasonable inference that Stevens know the basis 
upon which Gray was feeding the cattle and that Stevens 
may not, after ten years, insist that Gray should furnish 
iten1ized accounts of the cost of the feed that the steers 
ate. The evidence shows, without conflict, that Stevens 
has, ever since the partnership ended, attempted, without 
success, to secure fron1 the defendant an accounting (Tr. 
32). 
As we have pointed out in our original brief, part-
ners are accountable to each other as a fiduciary. It is 
so provided by U.C.A., 1943 69-1-18 and 19. There is 
no valid reason why the obligation should be changed 
because Gray may have raised some of the feed on the 
ranch which he was leasing. He had a pair of scales on 
the ranch where the cattle were being fed (Tr. 293 and 
347). The barley that defendant fed to the steers was 
rolled. According to defendant's testimony, it cost 15 
cents per cwt. to get it rolled (Tr. 354). Of necessity, 
if defendant raised any barley on the ranch which he fed 
to the steers it must have been weighed. to ascertain the 
cost of the rolling. No claim is made that the defendant 
raised any corn cottonseed meal or bran on the farm. 
He must, therefore, have purchased the same. He kept 
a checking account and whenever it served his purposes, 
he produced his checks. Independent of any law the most 
elementary principles of fair dealing dictates that a 
record should be kept involving the expenditures of 
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many thousands of dollars. Not only did the plaintiff 
have a right to rely upon the statutory law of this state, 
but so far as we know everyone who engages in any kind 
of business, especially since income taxes have been 
exacted, keeps or should keep records of the expenses 
of conducting his business. 
On page 10 of respondent's brief, it is said that 
there is no question about Gray's good faith. The record 
does not bear out that statement. The least that one 
can do who wishes to be fair is to keep a record of the 
expenditures he has made when he seeks to be reimbursed 
therefor. It is not the stamp of fair dealing to attempt 
to secure nearly twice as much for f~eding steers and 
providing men and equipment to feed the same as is 
charged by others for furnishing the same or similar 
feed and service. It is difficult to believe that the re-
spondent did not know that he had received $1000.00 
overpayment on the sale of partnership cattle until he 
was confronted with the telegram "Exhibit U" which 
showed that he had received the same. It is further said 
that Gray, not Stevens, rendered his personal services 
without compensation and that he it was who plowed 
through the snow from Nephi to Sage Valley. Just what 
is claimed by such a statement, even if true, we are unable 
to comprehend. In light of the fact that Gray claims no 
compensation and concedes he is entitled to none, no 
useful purpose will be served by a discussion of the 
relative amount of services rendered by the two partners. 
Even if such matters were material, it is doubtful if Gray 
would gain anything by an examination of that phase 
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of the case, because so far as the evidence shows, Stevens 
probably did as much actual work as did Gray, even if, 
by some stretch of imagination, various automobile trips 
that Gray and his wife took, and which respondent seeks 
to charge to the partnership are to be regarded as proper 
charges against the partnership (Tr. 261 and 267). 
On page 11 of respondent's brief, it is said that it is 
absurd to contend that respondent should keep a record 
of what he expended for feed for the steers and at the 
srune tiine Inake a charge of $5.00 per head for wintering 
cattle. It is a matter of common knowledge that cattle 
being fed for beef are placed in feed lots and the feed 
hauled to them, and it is not only a simple matter but 
many feeders for their own information, weigh the feed 
that is eaten by the animals. Mr. Cowan kept records of 
the amount he fed (Tr. 480). On the other hand cattle 
that are wintered are usually permitted to run in an open 
field. Such was the way the cattle that Mr. Dixon win-
tered were handled as were those in Sage Valley. It 
would have been interesting if counsel, instead of using 
such characterizing words as absurdity, if he had inform-
ed the court how one could determine the amount of for-
age that is consumed by an animal that is running in a 
field. Would the one who is wintering cattle have some-
one follow the animals and make a record of the number 
of blades of grass or other forage that each animal eats~ 
To ask the question is to answer it. To say that plaintiff 
shows an absence of good faith because of the delay 
and that he knew at all times that Gray kept no records 
and that Stevens never requested information, is not 
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only without support in the evidence, but is contrary 
to the same. The evidence shows that Stevens attempted 
to, but was unable to get any accounting from Gray (R. 
32). So also is counsel in error when he says on page 
12 of respondent's brief that plaintiff claimed or de-
manded no information that was denied him (R. 6 and 
34). 
On pages 13 to 23 a number of cases are cited to 
the effect that defendant is entitled to the market value 
of the hay, grain, bran and cottonseed meal that was 
fed to the partnership steers even if some of the products 
were produced on the farm which was leased by Gray. 
We are at a loss to understand what bearing such cases 
have upon this controversy. At no time during the trial 
or at the argument at the conclusion of the evidence, or 
in our opening brief have we contended, nor do we now 
contend, that the fact that the defendant raised some of 
the hay and possibly some of the grain that was fed to 
the steers should deprive the defendant of the value of 
the feed consumed by the steers. What we do contend 
is that the defendant owed a duty, imposed by law, to 
keep a record of the amount he actually paid for feed 
and a record of the weight of the feed he may have raised 
which was fed to the beef steers. 
On pages 22 and 23 there is quoted certain evidence 
of the defendant as to the cost of feeding steers at the 
time of the trial and at some other time not specified 
in commercial feed fed lots. It is, of course, a matter of 
common knowledge that people who conduct a commercial 
feed lot do so for the profit to be made. There is a vast 
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difference between allowing Mr. Gray credit for the 
an1ount he paid for the feed that was consumed by the 
partnership steers or if he raised such feed the market 
value thereof, and allowing him the amount that com-
mercial feed lots are charging. If Gray is allowed credit 
for the amount he paid for the feed consumed by the 
steen; plus the market value of the products that he 
may have raised on the land he was leasing, he is not 
making a profit out of the partnership business. But, 
on the other hand, if the defendant is paid more than 
the actual cost of the feed together with the actual cost 
of feeding it to the steers, he would be making a profit 
out of the partnership business. Such, so far as we are 
advised, is the doctrine announced by the authorities 
generally including those cited by the respondent. 
On the bottom of page 23 of respondent's brief, 
attention is called to the fact that counsel for appellant 
stated that he had no objection to defendant "showing 
how many pounds of hay and grain and if he fixes the 
amount and the value of the hay and grain, I think that 
is the measure of damage." Counsel then says on the 
next page that because of such statement assignment of 
error numbered one is not made in good faith. For the 
writer of this brief to say that counsel for respondent 
is lacking in good faith when he says that assignment 
numbered one was not made in good faith would not 
enlighten the court or add any weight to our argument. 
If the defendant had produced some checks or other 
vouchers to show the amount that was fed to the steers 
under his charge we would not have had any valid objec-
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tion to such evidence. He did not offer any such evidence. 
On the contrary the most that can be said for defendant's 
testimony is that he was permitted, over objection of 
appellant's counsel, to express an opinion as to what he 
or his hired men may have fed to the steers. 
On page 25 of respondent's brief, it is said: 
"The testimony of defendant is positive, and 
is undisputed that he actually fed the quantities 
set out. * * * No witness was ever called to con-
tradict the defendant's testimony. * * * Mr. 
Provstgaard was called as plaintiff's witness; if 
anyone was in a position to contradict defend-
ant's testimony as to the amount of grain, bran, 
cottonseed meal and hay fed, it was the man who 
· actually did the feeding. Plaintiff's counsel, how-
ever, refrained from asking the witness any ques-
tion with respect to that 1natter. Defendant'~ 
testimony remains uncontradicted." 
The statements just quoted from respondent's brief 
shows the vice of admitting in evidence the testimony of 
the defendant as to the credit he should be allowed for 
feeding partnership steers. If, as counsel says, Mr. 
Provstgaard fed the steers and only he knows what they 
ate, then any testimony that may have been given by the 
defendant on that subject matter would, of necessity, be 
hearsay and hence incompetent. If the law should be that 
the hearsay testimony of the defendant, that he caused 
to be fed to the partnership steers the quantity of feed 
that he testified to without any record to support the 
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san1e, n1u~t be believed, then indeed the law touching 
~uch 1uatters 1nust be radically revised. 
The authorities teach the requireinent that a partner 
account to his copartner must be such as to afford an 
opportunity to the copartner to test the fact or the pro-
priety of the expenditures and give the court the basis 
for detenuining fr01n the facts of the transaction whether 
the copartner has faithfully performed his duty. See 
authorities cited on page 29 of appellant's original brief. 
So far as is n1ade to appear neither :Mr. Gray nor ~Ir. 
Provstgaard knew or could have known the mnount of 
feed that was fed to the partnership steers. Obviously 
~Ir. Gray, not having fed the steers and having failed 
to present any checks or other records to show the 
amount consumed, could not from memory recall such 
facts. So also is there a total absence of evidence from 
which it could be inferred that Provstgaard knew the 
amount of feed that the steers fed by defendant Gray 
consumed. 
A reading of the testimony of the respondent Gray 
makes it clear that the most favorable view that can be 
taken of his testimony is that he expressed his opinion 
as to the amount of feed consumed by the steers fed by 
him. There are, of course, cases where expert testimony 
must be resorted to as a matter of necessity. Indeed 
one of the requisites for the admission of opinion evi-
dence is necessity. 32 C.J.S., page 73, Sec. 445 and cases 
cited in foot notes. In this case if the necessity existed 
for the admission of the opinion evidence of the respond-
ent, such necessity was brought about by his failure to 
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perform his duty to keep books or other reliable records. 
_Moreover if the argument made on behalf of respondent 
to the effect that respondent's testimony as to the amount 
eaten by the steers must be believed because not contra-
dicted, then by the same token his testimony must have 
been believed if he had testified that the steers consumed 
hay and grain of the value of 75 cents or more per day. 
One of the reasons for the requirement that the testimony 
of a partner must be supported with proper records is 
that otherwise the door is thrown wide open for the 
perpetration of fraud. 
REPLY TO POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOW-
ING DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR THE ITEMS MENTIONED 
IN POINT FOUR OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
Much of what is said under respondent's point two 
has been replied to under point one hereof, and we shall 
not repeat what is there said except to again observe 
that Gray did not do the feeding and hence could not 
know what was fed except by hearsay; that .if he kept 
a record he did not produce the same or explain why the 
same was not produced; that while it appears respondent 
kept a checking account and he produced cancelled checks 
when it served his purpose, he did not produce any can-
celled checks for feed that he bought or offer any testi-
mony why cancelled checks for feed were not produced. 
It should further be noted that on pages 28 and 29 
of appellant's brief we pointed out an error in computa-
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tion in the su1n of $760.00 in favor of the respondent and 
for which he "·a~ erroneou~ly given credit. No claim is or 
can be ~urre~sfully made that the trial court properly 
allowed respondent credit for that amount. 
On page :2G of respondent's brief, it is again appar-
ently urged that respondent's testimony should be taken 
at it~ face value. It is further stated that cattle may be 
maintained without losing weight on much smaller feed-
ing than when being fed for beef. This later observation 
can haYe no bearing upon this controversy. All of the 
witnesses called by the plaintiff testified as to the feed 
consumed by cattle being fed for beef. It is true that 
the "·itnesses produced by the plaintiff had not fed 
exactly the same number or exactly the same kind of feed 
that respondent claims to have fed. If such fact is of 
controlling importance, then indeed can a partner, by 
failing to perform his duty of keeping proper records 
write his own ticket and charge his copartner whatever 
he sees fit by saying as is attempted here, "I did or 
caused the feeding to be done and you don't know what 
I did or caused to be done and therefore you must take 
my word for it." The purport of such argument is that 
one partner may bind his copartner as to the cost of 
feeding partnership steers by failing to perform his duty 
of keeping records unless someone can be found to tes-
tify to having fed an equal number of steers, with the 
same appetite, of the same weight, identically the same 
kind of feed for the same length of time and under the 
same climatic conditions, etc. If that is the law then a 
copartner instead of being under the obligation of a 
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fiduciary as the law provides would be at liberty to fleece 
his partner with impunity. 
The purpose of feeding steers for beef is, of course, 
to give them all they will eat in order to get them fat. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that steers being 
prepared for market are not fed merely enough to keep 
them alive. On pages 29 and 30 of respondent's brief 
illustrations are given of what David Schuler may or 
may not have done under his contract to feed some of 
the partnership steers for 30 cents per day, which in-
cluded the equipment necessary to haul the feed. So far 
as appears the manner in which Mr. Schuler fed the 
steers was entirely satisfactory to the respondent. 
On page 33 of respondent's brief, it is said that the 
steers fed by Gray made an increase of 200 pounds over 
a period of 141 days. Here again there is total failure 
of any record or other evidence to support such claim. 
He produced nothing to show the weight of the steers 
either when they were put in or taken out of the feed 
lots. There is nothing which shows that Gray gave the 
steers that were fed under his direction any better care 
than was given to the steers testified to by the other wit-
nesses. 
On pages 32, 33 and 34 of respondent's brief, the 
testimony of Howard Stevens is discussed, and attention 
is called to Exhibit F, which seems to have been the 
Bill of Sale for the cattle fed by Howard Stevens. We 
are at a loss to see where respondent can derive any 
c01nfort from such testimony. Howard Stevens made 
an estimate that the steers weighed around 950 pounds 
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when they were put in the feed yards and were fed 130 
days { Tr. 33~). He. further testified that the steers 
weighed about 1140 pounds per head when they went 
out (Tr. 553). Later on cross-exan1ination, he stated that 
he belieYed the steers weighed 1100 pounds when they 
were sold (Tr. 37(i). It will be noted that Howard Stevens 
merely gave his judgment as to what the cattle weighed 
when they were put on feed and when they had been 
fed for 130 days. It may be that he was in error as to 
his judgn1ent of weights, but that does not show that 
they were not properly fed. 
The other matters discussed under Point Three of 
respondent's brief are covered by our original brief and 
we shall not add to what is there said. 
REPLY TO POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF CREDIT FOR WINTERING FORTY-THREE 
HEAD OF CATTLE IN 1937-1938. 
Fnder point three of respondent's brief, it is argued 
that the cattle plaintiff claimed were wintered by him 
were not Grantsville cattle and the year is wrong and. 
therefore the trial court properly denied plaintiff credit 
for feeding cattle even though the plaintiff did feed 
the number of head and for the price claimed by him. 
Even if we were to concede respondent is right as to 
the particular cattle wintered and the year when win-
tered, which we do not concede, it has always been the 
law in this jurisdiction so far as we are advised that 
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such an immaterial variance does not effect the right 
of recovery. U.C.A. 1943 104-14-1 and cases cited in 
footnote. 
REPLY TO POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN MAKING ITS 
FINDING No. 5 AND IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT CREDIT 
FOR THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN POINT THREE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 
The vice of allowing credit to a partner for items 
for which no voucher is presented and then allowing 
credit for other items of the same kind where vouchers 
are presented is made evident by the various items for 
hay discussed under Point Four of respondent's brief. 
Thus the respondent sought and was awarded credit 
for hay fed and to the partnership steers that were being 
fed for beef without any vouchers or other evidence, 
except his expressed opinion and then he produces a 
number of checks which he claims were paid for hay fed 
to other partnership cattle. There is no way that appel-
lant can ascertain whether the hay for which credit is 
claimed was hay fed to the steers that were being fed 
for beef or to other cattle. In other words, the appellant 
is at the absolute mercy of the respondent under such 
circumstances. There is the additional circumstance 
which casts grave doubt on those claims as pointed out 
in our original brief, namely, it is claimed that the ques-
tioned checks were given for hay fed to partnership 
cattle that were brought in from Mosida and Sage Valley. 
The McClellan checks are dated April 7, 1937 while the 
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evidence shows that the partnership cattle to which it is 
claimed the hay was fed were in l\losida and Sage Val-
ley at the tiine of the alleged purchase and were not 
brought to the ranch leased by Gray until the following 
:Jiay. 'Ye haYe nothing further to add by way of reply 
to Point Four of respondent's brief beyond what is said 
in our original brief. 
REPLY TO POINT FIYE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED FROM HIS OWN USE 
THE SUM OF $77,145.49 FROM THE SALE OF PARTNER-
SHIP CATTLE. 
'Ve have discussed this matter at some length in 
our original brief and little need be added to what is 
there said. Were it not for the fact that Mr. Gray (in 
the face of the pleadings and what it was stipulated ~T r. 
Dixon would testify to), testified that he did not pay 
$1000.00 on the note, there would be merit to the claim 
that he was entitled to a credit of the $1000.00. It will 
be noted that by his amended counterclaim, respondent 
charges himself with the sum of $77,145.49 (R. 41). 
Thus both respondent's pleading and evidence shows 
that he should be charged with the $1000.00. In order to 
reconcile such pleading and the evidence of the respond-
ent with the stipulation referred to in respondent's brief 
on pages 43 to 46 is that the $1000.00 paid on the partner-
ship note was partnership money received from the sale 
of partnership cattle not otherwise accounted for. If 
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plaintiff paid the $1000.00 from his own funds, it is to 
say the least extremely unlikely that he would be so 
positive that he did not pay the same. 
REPLY TO POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED FROM HIS OWN USE THE 
MONEY MENTIONED UNDER APPELLANT'S ASSIGN-
MENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX. 
In our original brief, we have discussed this point 
at some length and do not wish to enlarge on what is 
there said. We do wish to correct the impression left 
by respondent's brief when he says that there was sub-
stantial and competent evidence to justify the court in 
making its finding upon that matter. The fact of the 
matter is the trial court made no finding one way or the 
other on that issue. It will be observed that on page 2 of 
respondent's brief, it is said that the case and the deci-
sion apparently resulted in much more confusion of the 
matter to counsel than to the trial court. From the argu-
ment made to the phantom finding as to the issues dis-
cussed under point six of respondent's brief, it is quite 
apparent that it was respondent's counsel who is refer-
red to as being much more confused than the trial court. 
REPLY TO POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING TO 
CHARGE DEFENDANT WITH AT LEAST THIRTY-ONE 
HEAD OF PARTNERSHIP CATTLE FOR WHICH HE DID 
NOT ACCOUNT. 
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On page 46 of respondent's brief, it is stated that 
in one place in appellant's brief he claims that 31 and 
in another place 35 head of cattle were not accounted for 
by defendant. Counsel is in error in making such state-
ment. \Yhat we do state is the fact that there were 35 
head of cattle more purchased than are accounted for 
as having been sold and that not more than four head 
are accounted for as having been lost or having died. 
It is true that we clain1ed, and we submit that the evi-
dence without conflict shows that 1\fr. Gray, according 
to his own evidence, bought and sold a number of cattle 
without the knowledge of ~Ir. Stevens. That matter is 
discussed and the place in the transcript where the evi-
dence can be found is referred to on page 9 and 10 of 
appellant's original brief. 
Counsel for respondent is clearly in error in the 
statement made on page 50 of his brief that it is undis-
puted that the plaintiff received the money for the sale 
of seven head of cattle that were sold at Delta. We have 
discussed that phase of the case at considerable length 
under Point Six, pages 52 to 55 of our original brief. 
We have there pointed out the various conflicting state-
ments of respondent (Tr. pages 297 to 300, 305 to 307, 
and 312 to 316), and to the testimony of the appellant 
(Tr. 536-7) where he positively stated that he did not 
receive the money and that he kept a bank account in 
which he deposited his receipts, but no deposit of any 
such amount was made by him. On the other hand, Mr. 
Gray deposited to his account $986.00 on July 10, 1937, 
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say it was not for the sale of cattle (Tr. 328). 
On pages 51 to 53 of respondent's brief reference 
is made to some bits of evidence and an attempt is made 
to draw the conclusion that respondent is chargeable 
with only 1370 cattle. The evidence upon which reliance 
is based at most is a mere estimate. Thus, notwithstand-
ing, he said that he did not feed any of his own cattle 
after he began feeding partnership cattle (Tr. 253). 
Later he said he had around 300 head of his own in the 
feed yard with 17 or 18 head of partnership cattle. So 
also is the evidence uncertain as to the number of cattle 
that Mr. Shelly Dixon wintered (Tr. 165). Indeed all or 
substantially all of the difficulty which confronts us in 
this case is brought about by the failure of the respondent 
to perform his duty to keep a record of his transactions 
for and on behalf of the partnership. If respondent 
wishes an answer to his question as to what became of 
41 head of cattle he can find the answer in the testimony 
of his own witness (Tr. 134 to 136). 
It is very significant that at no time prior to the 
submission of this case is there any evidence or pleading 
which even remotely intimates that the plaintiff ever had 
in his possession or that he disposed of any partnership 
cattle that were not accounted for. It was not until the 
amended counterclaim was filed that respondent made 
any such suggestion, which as we have pointed out in 
our original brief was not until Sept. 25, 1947 (see stamp 
of Clerk on the back of R. 75). The trial was concluded 
on July 23, 1947. In light of the time that elapsed between 
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the time of the trial of this case which began on June 17, 
19-!7 and the tin1e it concluded on July 23, 1947 it is, to 
say the least, difficult to believe that it did not occur to 
the respondent that the plaintiff had failed to account 
for smne of the partnership cattle if such were the fact. 
On the other hand it is quite obvious that when the evi-
dence was all in, the respondent discovered that there 
were at least 31 head of cattle unaccounted for and that 
he was chargeable with such cattle the same as the other 
that he stated he did not have the slightest idea as to 
when or where or to whom they were sold, notwithstand-
ing he had their weights ( Tr. 297 et seq.). 
REPLY TO POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S F AlLURE TO ALLOW DEFEND-
ANT $1000.00 FOR THE USE OF DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL 
AUTOMOBILE IN TRANSACTING PARTNERSHIP BUSI-
NESS. 
We have already directed the attention of the court 
to the evidence touching the use of the automobile. It 
is obvious that the court among its numerous other 
errors and oversights failed to dispose of the issue as 
to the use of the automobile. 
REPLY TO POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT $1,701.23 OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT 
OF INTEREST. 
As we have pointed out in our original brief, that it 
would be a waste of time to argue the matter of interest 
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at this time. There are numerous errors in respondent's 
computation of interest, but until the nurnerous disputed 
items are determined, it would be a total loss of time 
and money to attempt to compute interest, and we are 
therefore refraining from doing so. 
REPLY TO POINT TEN 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT ANY CREDIT FOR OR CHARGE THE 
PLAINTIFF WITH ANY MINERSVILLE CATTLE. 
We have already directed the attention of the court 
to the facts connected with his claim under Point Seven 
and to the fact that there is not a scintilla of evidence 
to support such claim. Also that no such claim was ever 
asserted until after the case was tried and submitted and 
then only as an amended counterclaim. Moreover the 
defendant Gray testified at some length as to what 
became of the Minersville cattle. He stated that on Dec. 
1, 1936 he went with Mr. Stevens in Mr. Gray's car to 
Minersville and purchased cattle there and at Milford; 
that these cattle so purchased were shipped to Payson 
and taken to his, defendant's ranch (Tr. 134). Of the 
cattle purchased 31 were purchased at Minersville (Tr. 
31). Thus not only is there no evidence that the plaintiff 
received and failed to account for the Minersville cattle, 
but defendant says he received the same at his ranch. 
It will be further noted that in his amended counterclaim, 
defendant states that in 1937-38 Stevens wintered 43 
head and Gray 34 head of cattle at $5.00 per head (R. 
14-47). It will be noted that cattle fed by Gray grew 
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from 3-! to -t I between the tin1e of filing the original 
and the mnended counterclaiin (R. 1-t and -t7). It Inay 
be that one or both of these date8 is wrong, but if so 
that cannot effect the results except possibly as to a 
~mall amount of interest. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the judgment appealed from 
should be reversed and the appellant granted the relief 
prayed for in his original brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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